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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the performance of historically underrepresented firms, which 
includes women‐owned businesses and socially disadvantaged businesses.  We 
examine performance in the context of securing public contracts and compare the 
performance of these historically underrepresented firms to those of non‐minority 
small and large businesses.  Utilizing a sample of all contracts awarded by the Johnson 
Space Center, a NASA directorate located in Houston, Texas, which identified 5,676 
contracts totaling approximately $157 billion, we found that small businesses received 
around 63% of all contracts.  The results indicate that more diverse firms received 
higher awards than specialists and that disadvantaged firms received higher dollar 
awards than general small businesses.  In addition, women‐owned businesses neither 
outperformed nor performed more poorly than general small business in the dollar 
amounts of contracts received, and they are neither more or less specialized than 
general small and large businesses. A discussion, practical implications, and future 
research ideas are also presented. 
 
Keywords: women owned businesses, socially disadvantaged businesses, historically 
underrepresented firms, public-private sector 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Strategic alliances, joint ventures, 
partnerships, and other interorganizational 
relationships between businesses have 
continued to grow in popularity in both 
business and research (Das & He, 2006; 
Kelly, 2007; Lee & Gongming, 2007).  
Small businesses have been recognized as 
being uniquely suited for partnerships with 
other organizations due to many advantages 
such as a simple organizational structure, a 
focus on growth and continuity, flexibility, 
and central decision making (Gelinas & 
Bigras, 2004).  In addition, these small 
businesses have access to additional 
resources and learning opportunities that 
can boost performance (Beekman & 
Robinson, 2004). 
For many small businesses, collaboration 
with the public sector is vital.  In fact, many 
small businesses view public-private 
partnerships as their primary area of work 
and expertise.  Public-private partnerships 
are gaining popularity as some research 
indicates that they increase innovation and 
opportunities for growth, and that they are 
the way of the future due to the 
interconnectedness of industries and work 
sectors (Richter, 2004). 
Bovaird (2004) defines a public-private 
partnership as a working arrangement 
between a public sector organization and an 
organization outside of the public sector.  
The form of these partnerships can be very 
broad as can be the range of products and 
services they produce or render.  One 
advantage of these business-to-business 
relationships is they can create value 
networks that make up a business 
ecosystem that can provide advantages to 
all parties involved (Beekman & Robinson, 
2004; Sawhney & Zabin, 2002). These 
connections can take place in many arenas 
which include state and local governments, 
international agencies such as the UN, and 
even the federal government as these 
organizations partner with the commercial 
sector (Richter, 2004). 
While many federal contracts go to large, 
publicly-traded firms, small businesses are 
well represented.  For the past several 
decades, the federal government has 
recognized the job creation and innovation 
potential of small and mid-sized businesses 
(Audretsch, 2003).  This recognition has led 
to increased emphasis on funding small to 
mid-sized businesses, thereby enhancing 
job creation benefits.  Specific targeting of 
minority-owned and innovative businesses 
spurs the emergence and creation of such 
ventures (Cooper, 2003).  Along these lines, 
public policy supporting preferential 
treatment of small businesses is aimed at 
the broader economic benefits resulting 
from heightened job creation and 
innovation. 
For the federal government, the benefits 
accrued from the private-public partnership 
go beyond job creation.  Small businesses 
with strong connections to public and non-
profit entities - such as universities and 
other research institutions - achieve 
heightened levels of innovation with lower 
direct investment in R&D (Audretsch, 
2003).  Thus, federal procurement aimed at 
innovation, such as the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) program 
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enables the creation of many new business 
ventures and enhances the 
commercialization of government 
sponsored research (Held, 2007). 
The second thrust of public policy addresses 
institutional inequities blocking certain 
entrepreneurs from equal market 
opportunities.  Women-owned and 
minority-owned businesses are 
systematically underrepresented in most 
industries and face many institutional 
obstacles that extend well beyond simply 
running an effective small business.  For 
example, minority-owned and women-
owned businesses suffer excessively high 
mortality (Robb, 2002) and face substantial 
challenges in securing institutional sources 
of capital (Treichel & Scott, 2006).  
Seeking to mitigate these inequities, the 
federal government fills a gap in sourcing 
for entrepreneurial capital (Cooper, 2003), 
extending several programs targeting 
strategically disadvantaged businesses. 
In addition to specialized sources of funds 
and initial funding, small businesses gain 
benefits of legitimacy from their business 
relationships with public institutions 
(Connell, 2009).  The documentation 
required to become a candidate for receipt 
of federal procurement, along with the due 
diligence applied in awarding such 
contracts, makes the federal government an 
important ally for emerging ventures.  This 
legitimacy carries forward to increased 
access and interest from venture capital for 
growth and technology oriented small 
businesses (Lerner, 1999).   
While an emerging body of research offers 
insight into the nature of small-business 
performance within public procurement, 
little is known about the comparative 
performance of small business types within 
those systems.  To date, the research tends 
towards descriptions of the benefits of 
specific programs (Abramowicz & Sparks, 
2007; Connell, 2009), need for specifically 
targeted programs (Reardon, Nicosia, & 
Moore, 2007) or public performance of 
major government entities (Held, Edison, 
Pfleeger, Anton, & Clancy, 2006).  We 
lack, however, information regarding the 
comparative performance of focal 
categories (e.g. women-owned and 
minority-owned ventures) relative to their 
counterparts.  To this end, a gap exists in 
identification of whether the various 
focused programs result in performance 
gains for small business. 
It is along these lines that we proceed in our 
current research.  In this paper, we explore 
four research questions.  First, how do small 
businesses fare in their receipt of contract 
awards?  Second, are there differences in 
the extent of specialization and 
generalization between small and large 
businesses in their receipt of awards?  
Third, are focused categories of small 
business better (or worse) positioned in 
their receipt of contractual awards?  Finally, 
are there differences in the specialization 
and generalization levels of focused 
categories of small businesses? 
Our research examines the performance of 
small businesses and various types of small 
businesses in terms of their receipt of 
federal contracts and dollars awarded.  We 
focus on the relationship with a single 
federal agency because of that agency’s 
broad funding in supporting numerous 
projects.  The businesses represented 
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include large multi-national firms, small 
businesses, and minority-owned businesses.  
The contracts awarded include basic 
services, research and development, 
construction, and substantial investments in 
technology. 
FEDERAL CONTRACTS AND 
BUSINESS CATEGORIES 
Our examination of small business 
performance distinguishes between several 
demographic categorizations of small 
business contracts.  The distinctions we use 
to separate categories of small business are 
defined by the federal government.  Each of 
these categories represents a classification 
of small business ownership of specific 
interest to the federal government.  
Depending on the category, this interest 
may involve historical underrepresentation, 
challenges in acquisition of capital, and 
proclivity to generate innovations.  Each 
category consists of a series of rules and 
targets for the distribution of federally 
awarded contracts and, in some cases, 
provides for additional services (such as 
mentoring).  We provide definitions and 
background information for each of these 
categories in the following subsections. 
Small Business Categories 
The Small Business Administration (SBA) 
provides standards for definitions of small 
businesses, categories of small business, 
and additionally manages the certification 
of firms following within certain special 
categorical programs.  For all small 
business categories, the primary designation 
depends on the size aspect.  The SBA uses 
classification standards based on both 
number of employees and annual sales 
revenues.  Depending on NAICS 
classification, a firm is considered small if 
its sales are under the $12 million range.  
However, for certain industries such as 
most construction industries (NAICS 23), 
businesses are classified as small up 
through $35 million in sales.  Similarly, for 
many segments of professional, scientific 
and technical (NAICS 54), firms are 
considered small through $27 million in 
sales.  Using employee metrics, firms are 
generally considered small if they have 
fewer than 500 employees, although 
significant variation exists depending on the 
industry sector. 
The federal government focuses 
procurement efforts on small businesses out 
of recognition of the significant economic 
impact and job creation typical of small 
ventures.  Current guidelines from the 
federal government set targets for federal 
direct procurement contract awards for 
small businesses.  This target has grown 
since its inception and currently provides 
23% of direct procurement (Reardon et al., 
2007).  While the economic impact of 
successful small businesses is noteworthy, 
small businesses also face substantial 
failure rates.   
Robb (2002) finds that four-year mortality 
rates for small businesses exceed 50%.  
Further, the mortality rate is substantially 
higher for minority-owned firms and 
women-owned businesses fail 2-3% more 
frequently than male owned businesses 
within each category.  In addition to 
heightened failure rates, minority-owned 
(Robb, 2002) and women-owned (Reardon 
et al., 2007) businesses are substantially 
underrepresented in most industry 
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categories.  Recognizing this, the federal 
government provides preferential treatment 
and offers support programs both through 
the SBA and through the agencies who 
manage procurement awards. 
Women-Owned Businesses 
The SBA defines a firm as women-owned if 
it meets the parameters for a small business 
and if a 51% ownership position is held by 
a woman.  Federal procurement procedures 
provide preferential selection practices 
towards firms who are women-owned and 
additional preferential programs are 
available for firms whose minority owner is 
women-owned and economically 
disadvantaged (Reardon et al., 2007). 
Women owners comprise a significant 
percentage of small businesses.  White 
females  (8.3%) are the fourth highest 
demographic likely to own or operate their 
own business following white males 
(14.4%), Asian (10.2%) and Hispanic 
(8.5%) (Blanchflower, 2009).  Further, 
facing slow gains in employment 
opportunities and inequality in larger firms, 
women increasingly turn to self-
employment.  Through 1997, the growth of 
women-owned businesses was roughly 
three times that of male-owned businesses 
and the magnitude of change is projected to 
increase (Daniel, 2004).  Daniel 
additionally notes that women who own 
businesses have an average income level 
2.5 times that of women who are not 
business owners. 
While Robb (2002) reports mortality rates 
for women-owned businesses as 2-3% more 
prevalent than male-owned counterparts, 
other evidence suggests that these 
mortalities may not represent firm failures.  
Indeed, discontinued firms with female 
ownership are substantially less likely to 
have entered bankruptcy than their male-
owned counterparts (Robinson, 2007) 
suggesting that this difference is driven by 
higher risk-aversion in female 
entrepreneurs.  While Robinson concludes 
that lower risk of firm failure should result 
in favorable capital access, women-owned 
firms have historically proven less likely to 
receive financing and receive lower 
financing amounts from institutional 
sources (Treichel & Scott, 2006). 
There are other issues facing women-owned 
businesses that include less early startup 
capital (S. Carter & Rosa, 1998), more 
difficulty securing loans (Verheul, 
Risseeuw, & Bartelse, 2002), and less credit 
history (Shaw, Carter, & Brierton, 2001).  
In addition, many women-owned businesses 
also have less managerial and technical 
experience (Chaganti & Parasuraman, 
1996) which may play a role in the higher 
mortality rate as indicated above.  When 
these constraints are coupled with the fact 
that women-owned businesses are more 
likely to enter industry sectors with higher 
failure rates (N. M. Carter & Williams, 
1997), it is easy to see why problems may 
exist.   
In terms of federal procurement awards, 
women-owned businesses are targeted for 
5% of all contracts.  However, Reardon et 
al. (2007) cautions that this target has never 
been hit and women-owned businesses 
actually receive approximately 3.5% of all 
federal contracts.  They additionally note 
that women typically receive fewer and 
smaller awards than their male counterparts.  
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Additionally, women-owned businesses are 
significantly underrepresented in virtually 
all industry categories when examining 
contracts awarded.  Some of these findings 
may be the result of women-owned 
businesses not having the capital nor being 
able to secure the financing necessary to 
win these contracts.   
Disadvantaged and 8(a) Disadvantaged 
Business 
The SBA classifies socially disadvantaged 
businesses (SDB) as unconditionally owned 
by U.S. citizens from socially and 
economically disadvantaged groups.  Under 
current classification, this includes (but may 
not be limited to) Black Americans, 
Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, 
and Asian Pacific Americans.  Groups 
receiving this classification are deemed 
socially and economically disadvantaged 
because of historic discrimination in capital 
and credit opportunities.   
Robb (2002) notes that small businesses 
with ownership from SDB categories have 
significantly higher mortality rates.  
Blanchflower (2009) further notes that 
black owned businesses are significantly 
underrepresented in virtually every industry 
and only notes a growth in construction - 
and this following roughly a decade of 
contraction in construction.  He reports 
substantial differences in access to capital 
sources, with minority owners facing 
systematically lower opportunities for 
funding.  These findings are consistent with 
other evidence that black entrepreneurs face 
higher denial rates than white counterparts 
(Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, & Wolken, 2002). 
Unlike some other programs (e.g. SBIR), 
SDB's are allowed to enter into partnerships 
and joint ventures with non-disadvantaged 
owners in a mentor-protégé relationship 
(Abramowicz & Sparks, 2007).  The 
program sets a 10% funding goal for any 
federal agency awarding contracts in excess 
of $250,000.  While this establishes 
favorable evaluation of disadvantaged and 
8(a) disadvantaged firms, judicial 
requirements mandate that distribution of 
awards must be race neutral in order to 
minimize discrimination against white 
owned small businesses and other non-
disadvantaged businesses (Myers Jr & Ha, 
2009).  The 8(a) program additionally 
extends to sub-contracting relationships.  
Under this program, large primary 
contractors receive bonus payments if they 
subcontract with 8(a) disadvantaged firms 
(Abramowicz & Sparks, 2007). 
Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) Program 
Initially created by the Small Business 
Innovation Development Act of 1982, the 
SBIR program was initially targeted for 
1.25% of extramural research funding (Held 
et al., 2006).  Since its inception, the 
program has raised its targets to 2.5% for 
projects meeting SBIR characteristics.  The 
program initially expired in 2008, but has 
been extended through a series of short-
term packages involving elements of the 
stimulus program (Seong, Horn, & Held, 
2008).  Requirements for participation in 
SBIR research include independent 
ownership (at least 51%) by a U.S. citizen 
or lawful resident with the firm located 
within the United States.  The goals of 
SBIR are to increase use of small 
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businesses R&D, enhance 
commercialization of federal R&D, and 
improve access for minority and 
disadvantaged businesses (Held et al., 
2006). 
The motivation for the SBIR is reflected 
upon the advantages small firms have in 
generating innovation (Audretsch, 2003) 
and extends the legitimacy benefits for 
small businesses with government contracts 
(Connell, 2009) ultimately leading to 
increased creation of innovative new 
ventures (Cooper, 2003).  Research 
examining the performance of SBIR firms 
finds that recipients of SBIR contracts 
create more jobs (Connell, 2009) and grow 
sales faster than similar sized counterparts 
(Lerner, 1999).   
The growth advantages of SBIR firms may 
represent inherently greater innovative 
productivity for the award winners, rather 
than innovation created as a result of federal 
funding (Wallsten, 2000).  Wallsten 
suggests SBIR funding simply functions as 
a supplement to firm R&D investment.  
Whether SBIR causes innovation or 
innovative firms receive more SBIR funds, 
a positive correlation exists between SBIR 
funding and innovative firms.  Audresch 
(2003) observes that “some of the most 
innovative American companies received 
early stage finance from SBIR, including 
Apple Computer, Chiron, Compaq and 
Intel” (p. 133). 
SBIR participation occurs in three funding 
stages, progressing from phase-1 merit, to 
phase-2 primary R&D, and, occasionally, 
phase-3 follow-up (Held et al., 2006).  The 
program is highly selective with only 17% 
of applicants receiving phase-1 funding and 
merely 50% of those moving on to phase-2 
funding (Cooper, 2003).  The total federal 
SBIR program generates roughly 4000 
contracts per year going to some 1500 
firms, many of whom win multiple 
contracts (Connell, 2009).  Firms winning 
SBIR contracts also move on to receive 
other non-SBIR federal contracts, 
prompting Held and colleagues (2006) to 
suggest SBIR functions as a recruiting tool 
bringing firms into a federal participation 
network. 
Some criticism has been made of the SBIR 
program.  Held and colleagues (2006) 
observe that the SBIR program, while 
significant, remains a small part of the 
overall small business program.  Further, 
SBIR initiatives targeted at women-owned 
businesses and SDB's may be less effective 
than distinct programs targeted at those two 
groups.  Additionally, Seong and colleagues 
(2008) find that SBIR administrative costs 
are quite high, running 4-5 times the cost of 
similar small business targeting programs.  
They caution, however, that these 
administrative costs may be driven by the 
nature of the innovation research.  Held and 
colleagues (2006) further observe that the 
commercialization goals for SBIR are 
generally only met by a handful of firms.  
This conclusion echoes arguments by 
Lerner (1999) suggesting that the high 
performance outcomes for SBIR firms may 
be an artifact produced by a handful of 
firms in venture-capital dense geographic 
communities (e.g. Silicon Valley). 
Research Questions 
In the preceding sections, we have defined 
and characterized small business categories 
specifically highlighted in federal 
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procurement programs.  These small 
business categories reflect demographic 
groups who are underrepresented in 
entrepreneurship, have higher failure rates 
for their ventures, and are composed of 
entrepreneurs who are systematically 
restrained in access to institutional capital. 
If this were a sample of small businesses 
without partnership connections to the 
federal government, we might expect 
performance below that of non-minority 
small businesses and large businesses.  
However, given decades of attention by 
federal procurement, including special 
programs, incentives, and within network 
mentoring, it is quite possible that these 
historically underrepresented firms will fare 
similarly to their non-minority small and 
large business counterparts. 
ANALYSIS 
Our study involves the examination of all 
contracts awarded between the years of 
2005 and 2007 by Johnson Space Center 
(JSC), a NASA directorate located in 
Houston, TX.  JSC engages in a number of 
public-private partnerships with both large 
and small firms.  This includes funding for 
ongoing projects, such as Space Station 
Freedom, emerging R&D, and general 
facilities development and management.  In 
addition to relationships with direct 
contractors, larger recipients, such as 
Boeing, often sub-contract out parcels of 
their awards, creating an interdependent 
network of small to large businesses 
focusing on a variety of projects. 
Primary contractual data is available online 
through the NASA Acquisition Internet 
Service (NAIS).  This website allows for 
ad-hoc queries on all direct relationships 
between NASA (and its directorates) and 
the various organizations it awards funding.  
This includes for-profits, not for-profits, 
NGO's, educational institutions, as well as 
state and municipal governments.  For the 
purposes of our study, we omit contracts 
awarded to educational and governmental 
institutions.  Further, in our examination of 
small business performance, we also omit 
not-for profits and NGO's.   
Table 1 depicts the number of contracts and 
dollar value awarded for large businesses, 
small businesses and not-for-profits 
(including NGO's).  We specifically 
emphasize the dollar value awarded, rather 
than the total amount paid to the awardee.  
While this may at times overstate the 
amount each entity ultimately receives, it 
maintains a uniform presentation for all 
awards.  In some cases, awards were still 
being disbursed for contracts with lengthy 
durations, and emphasis on payments 
received would have underrepresented the 
actual commitment in the award.  We were 
able to identify 5,676 contracts amounting 
to roughly $157 billion awarded over the 
three years of our sample.  Not surprisingly, 
large businesses received the majority of the 
funded awards, taking in nearly 97% of all 
funds.  However, small businesses received 
the overwhelming number of contracts, 
receiving approximately 63% of all 
contracts. 
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Table 1-Contracts Awarded Based on Size and Type of Business 
Category Contracts Awarded Dollars Awarded 
Large Business 1759 (31%) $151Bn (96.6%) 
Small Business 3567 (63%) $4.9Bn (3.1%) 
NFP 350 (6%) $.5Bn (.3%) 
 5676 $157Bn 
   
NAIS also provides categorization data for 
small businesses.  Prior to 2005, this 
information is generally restricted to the 
size of the business and whether it is a 
strategically disadvantaged business.  
However, beginning in 2005, this 
information was uniformly reported to 
include designations for women-owned 
businesses, disadvantaged businesses, 8(a) 
disadvantaged businesses, and SBIR firms, 
thereby allowing examination of various 
combinations of categories (e.g. women-
owned, disadvantaged businesses).  Below, 
Table 2 documents the number of firms, 
dollars received, and contracts received for 
all small business categories receiving 
awards in our sample period. Small 
businesses make up the largest number of 
firms in the sample (n = 958).  This 
category represents firms which do not meet 
the definitions for any other small business 
category. 
 
Table 2-Number of Firms, Dollar Amount Received, and Contracts Received  
Category Firms  Dollars 
Awarded 
 Contracts 
Awarded 
 
Small Business 958 73.6% $  1,624,624,022.76 33.4% 2514 70.5% 
Women-Owned 149 11.4% $ 562,639,152.00 11.6% 380 10.7% 
Disadvantaged 47 3.6% $  2,085,069,152.00 42.9% 155 4.3% 
8(a) 
Disadvantaged 11 .8% $  168,530,354.00 3.5% 79 2.2% 
SBIR 93 7.1% $  90,851,524.00 1.9% 256 7.2% 
WOB 
Disadvantaged 22 1.7% $  271,320,938.00 5.6% 121 3.4% 
WOB 8(a) 7 .5% $  43,675,446.00 0.9% 34 1.0% 
WOB SBIR 10 .8% $  8,494,100.00 0.2% 21 0.6% 
DIS SBIR 5 .4% $  2,064,673.00 0.0% 7 0.2% 
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While such businesses make up the majority 
of sampled small firms (74%), and receive a 
similar majority of the awarded contracts 
(71%), they receive the second largest level 
of awards (33%) behind that awarded to 
disadvantaged firms (43%) who represent a 
substantially smaller number of firms (4%).  
This cursory examination suggests that 
certain categories of small businesses 
perform better (or worse) than the general 
small business category.   
NAIS also contains information on the 
NAICS category associated with the 
contract award.  While this information is 
omitted in some cases, most of the contracts 
awarded to for-profit ventures contain this 
information.  An examination of the most 
frequently cited NAICS codes, the 
percentage for each category, and the rank 
order for that frequency within each 
category of business is shown in Table 3 
below.  NAIS reports this information at the 
six-digit NAICS code, and we retain that 
information in our documentation and 
subsequent analysis.  The most frequently 
occurring NAICS codes appear to come 
from NAICS 54, Professional, Scientific 
and Technical Services.  Indeed, six of the 
ten most frequent NAICS codes (roughly 
33%) come from this area.  In general, the 
most common NAICS codes are fairly well 
represented across all categories of 
business.  The two primary exceptions 
appear, at first glance, to come from 8(a) 
disadvantaged firms and SBIR firms for 
whom five and seven of the ten most 
common NAICS codes respectively do not 
appear. 
An examination of the top-ten NAICS 
codes by category and their relative weight 
within each category appears in Table 4 
below. This information offers insights into 
the nature of the differences observed 
initially in Table 3.  While SBIR firms only 
comprised three of the ten most common 
NAICS codes, the difference appears 
largely driven by the weight of the most 
frequent NAICS category for SBIR 
contracts.  NAICS 541710, R&D in 
Physical, Engineering and Life Sciences, 
makes up over 86% of the SBIR contracts 
awarded by JSC in this period.  To this end, 
SBIR firms mirror all other business 
categories in the fact that most awards come 
from NAICS 54.  The 8(a) disadvantaged 
businesses, however, differ significantly in 
the types of firms receiving contracts.  
Here, we find four of the ten most frequent 
awards coming from NAICS 23, 
Construction.  Further, these awards make 
up roughly 43% of the total contracts 
awarded to 8(a) firms. 
Our examination of contracts and dollars 
awarded suggested that different categories 
of small businesses perform differently in 
their receipt of awards.  However, our 
examination of the industries represented 
suggests differences only in the 8(a) 
disadvantaged category.  Other than 8(a) 
firms, the various categories of small 
business seem relatively equivalently spread 
across the same types of industries 
represented by large and non-minority small 
businesses.
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Table 3-NAICS Codes, Industry Category, and the Rank Order of Each Category 
NAICS Category Percent LB SB WOB DIS 8(A) SBIR WOBDIS 
541710 R&D Phys, Eng, and Life 14.1% 2 3 1 36 8 1 9 
541330 Engineering Services 7.2% 1 2 17 4 6 2 N/A 
334111 Electronic Computer Mfg 5.0% 4 1 5 26 N/A N/A 2 
443120 Computer and Software Stores 3.8% 3 4 N/A N/A N/A N/A 5 
541519 Other Computer Related Svc 3.8% 6 7 6 6 4 N/A 1 
541611 Adm Mgmt Consulting 3.3% 10 5 4 8 17 N/A 16 
541511 Custom Computer Programming 2.8% 15 8 45 35 1 6 14 
511210 Software Publishers 2.4% 5 10 10 33 N/A N/A 8 
541512 Computer Systems Design SVC 2.0% 8 19 46 10 N/A N/A 15 
337214 Office Furniture Mfg 1.8% 11 18 3 30 N/A N/A N/A 
28 
 
  
Table 4-NAICS Codes and Relative Weight Within Each Category 
Large 
Business 
Small  
Business 
Disadvantaged 
Business 
8(a)  
Disadvantaged 
Women-  
Owned SBIR 
Disadvantaged  
Women-owned 
541330 10.0% 334111 7.4% 238160 13.3% 541511 20.2% 541710 10.4% 541710 86.1% 541519 25.5% 
541710 6.6% 541330 7.2% 236210 8.9% 236210 19.1% 611430 10.4% 541330 2.9% 334111 23.6% 
443120 6.3% 541710 5.3% 238210 8.9% 238160 11.7% 337214 9.6% 334413 1.6% 423430 9.1% 
334111 4.0% 443120 4.3% 541330 8.1% 541519 8.5% 541611 5.2% 333999 1.2% 323115 5.5% 
511210 4.0% 541611 4.3% 236220 7.4% 237110 6.4% 334111 4.3% 336415 1.2% 443120 5.5% 
541519 3.6% 334112 3.6% 541519 6.7% 541330 6.4% 541519 3.5% 541511 1.2% 561612 5.5% 
335999 3.4% 541519 3.1% 541310 4.4% 237310 5.3% 611420 3.5% 927110 1.2% 237110 3.6% 
541512 3.3% 541511 3.0% 541611 3.7% 541710 3.2% 334515 2.6% 325411 0.8% 511210 3.6% 
541310 2.9% 334515 2.5% 423430 3.0% 561410 3.2% 421430 2.6% 334419 0.8% 541710 3.6% 
541611 2.9% 511210 2.2% 541512 3.0% 562910 3.2% 511210 2.6% 334510 0.8% 236220 1.8% 
All 
Other 53.1%  57.3%  32.6%  12.8%  45.2%  2.0%  12.7% 
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The remainder of our analysis examines 
receipt of federal contracts, dollars awarded, 
and degree of specialization and 
generalization.  Here we conducted 
regression models using three dependent 
variables: number of contracts awarded, 
log-dollar values of contracts awarded, and 
number of NAICS codes covered in 
contract awards.  We used three subsets of 
our data to conduct this analysis.  The first 
analysis examined differences across all for-
profit and not-for-profit firms (n = 1925).  
Our second analysis examined performance 
characteristics of all for-profit firms (n = 
1913).  Our final analysis examined 
differences across only small businesses (n 
= 1299).  These analyses are presented in 
Table 5 below.
 
Table 5-Comparison of For-Profit and Small Business Firms 
All for-profit firms    Small Business Only    
 
Model 
1  Model 2  
Model 
3  
Model 
4  Model 5  
DV 
## 
Contracts 
##NAIC
S  Log_Dollars 
## 
Contracts ##NAICS  
Predictor β p β p β p β p β p 
SB -.06 * -.09 **       
WOB -.00  .02  -.02  -.01  .03  
DIS .02  .09 ** .12 ** .02  .11 ** 
8(A) .03  .09 ** .10 ** .04  .12 ** 
SBIR -.04 † .13 ** .24 ** -.05 † .16 ** 
NFP 0          
Diversified .30 **   .20 ** .30 **   
R2 .10 ** .03 ** .15 ** .09 ** .05 ** 
n 1925  1813  1299  1299  1299  
Base Case 
Large 
Business 
Large 
Business 
Small 
Business 
Small 
Business Small Business 
† 0.1 * 0.05 ** 0.01 ** 0.001    
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In each regression, our predictors are 
categorical variables separating the base 
case from our categories of interest.  The 
base case is large businesses in model 1 and 
2 and general small businesses in models 3-
5.  Categorical predictors exist for general 
small businesses (in models 1 and 2) along 
with firms meeting government 
procurement program definitions for 
women-owned business, SDB's, SDB's 
meeting 8(a) requirements, and SBIR 
contracting firms.  In regression models 
examining contracts and dollars awarded, 
we additionally track the number of NAICS 
codes a firm operated in, thus estimating 
effects from diversification (multiple 
NAICS codes) and specialization (one 
NAICS code). 
Small Businesses and their Receipt of 
JSC Contracts 
Our first research question examines 
whether small businesses (and related 
subcategories) differ in their receipt of 
federal contracts.  We focus on contracts 
awarded, rather than dollars awarded, as the 
very definition of small under SBA rules 
suggests that small firms will receive 
inherently smaller contracts than large 
businesses.  We thus examine the number of 
contracts awarded as a function of the 
business category type, with large 
businesses representing the base case.  
Regression results are reported as Model 1 
in Table 5.  Our regression model is 
significant (R2 =.10; p<.001) and predictors 
for diversification (β=.30) and small 
business (β=-.06) are significant with the 
predictor for SBIR (β=-.04) approaching 
significance.  From this, we conclude that 
firms operating across multiple NAICS 
codes receive more contracts than specialist 
firms functioning in a single (or few) 
NAICS codes.  Further, individual small 
businesses receive fewer federal contracts 
and SBIR firms receive somewhat fewer 
federal contracts than do large businesses.  
None of the firms representing small 
businesses in disadvantaged minority 
groups differ substantially in their contract 
award characteristics. 
Small Business Specialization Within the 
JSC Contract Network 
Our second research question examines the 
extent to which small businesses, and 
categories of small businesses, differ in 
their extent of diversification or 
specialization.  Here, we use the number of 
NAICS codes a firm operates in as a 
dependent variable in a regression against 
the various categories of organizations, with 
large businesses functioning as a base case.  
Results for this regression are reported as 
Model 2 in Table 5. 
The regression model is significant (R2 = 
.03; p <.001), although the variance 
explained is quite low.  We find significant 
positive relationships for disadvantaged (β 
= .09), 8(a) qualifying firms (β = .09) and 
SBIR recipients (β = .13) along with a 
negative significant relationship for general 
small businesses (β = -.09).  From this, we 
conclude that SDB and SBIR program 
recipients tend to operate across more 
NAICS codes than do large businesses.  
Taking model 1 and 2 together, small 
businesses receive fewer contracts from JSC 
and tend to operate across fewer NAICS 
codes. 
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Small Business Categories and their 
Receipt of JSC Contracts 
Where our initial models compared the 
performance of small businesses and 
specific categories of small businesses 
relative to large businesses, we turn our 
attention now to the comparative 
performance within the small business 
subset itself.  Here our sample is reduced to 
firms meeting small business characteristics 
(n = 1299) and we examine results using 
both the number of contracts and dollars 
awarded.  Our predictor variables in this 
stage include the various categories of small 
business (with general small business 
functioning as the base case) along with a 
predictor for the number of NAICS codes 
the firm operates in.  The regression runs 
are presented as Model 3 and Model 4 in 
Table 5. 
Model 4 uses the log dollars of the contract 
awards as a dependent variable against the 
categorical predictors.  The model is 
significant (R2 = .15; p<.001) and we find a 
number of the predictors significant.  
Consistent with our examination across all 
organizations, more diversified firms 
receive higher dollar awards than do 
specialists (β = .20).  Additionally, both 
types of SDB's, disadvantaged firms (β = 
.12) and 8(a) classified firms (β = .10) 
receive higher dollar awards than general 
small businesses.  SBIR recipients (β = .24) 
also receive higher dollar awards than non-
SBIR small business recipients. 
Model 5 uses the number of contracts 
awarded as a dependent variable against the 
same range of predictors.  Once again the 
model is significant (R2 = .09), although 
few predictors reach significance.  
Consistent with earlier analysis, diversified 
firms receive more contracts (β = .30) than 
do specialists.  SBIR recipients (β = -.05) 
receive marginally fewer contracts than do 
non-SBIR small businesses - although the 
preceding results suggest these fewer 
contracts are more lucrative. 
Specialization of Small Businesses 
Awarded JSC Contracts 
Our final analysis examines the tendencies 
towards diversification or specialization for 
small business recipients of JSC contracts.  
Here, our dependent variable is the number 
of NAICS codes a firm operates in 
regressed against the various categories of 
small businesses, with general small 
businesses functioning as the base case.  
Results of this regression are depicted in 
Model 5 on Table 5, once again the model 
is significant (R2 = .05). 
We find significant, positive coefficients for 
both categories of SDB's with both 
disadvantaged firms (β = .11) and 8(a) firms 
(β = .12) functioning in more NAICS codes 
than do general small businesses.  
Additionally, SBIR firms (β = .16) tend to 
operate in more NAICS codes than do their 
non-SBIR general small business 
counterparts. 
DISCUSSION 
The Federal government expends some 
effort understanding the impact of small 
business on the economy as well as 
understanding institutional biases which 
undermine the potential effectiveness of 
many categories of small business.  While 
small business have historically functioned 
as job and innovation incubators for the 
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United States (Audretsch, 2003) and while 
entrepreneurship generally produces better 
earnings and lifestyle opportunities for 
many individuals (Daniel, 2004), these 
benefits do not come without pitfalls.  Small 
businesses retain a very high failure rate 
(Robb, 2002) and outcomes for small 
business are not equivocal across 
demographic groups.  We discuss our 
findings categorically, looking at findings 
for general small business, women-owned 
business, SDB's, and SBIR businesses. 
General small business includes all firms 
meeting SBA definitions who did not fall 
into any other category.  While these firms 
receive the largest number of total contracts 
(70.5%), they receive the second largest 
total awards (33.4%).  Considering that 
general small businesses comprise the 
largest number of firms in the small 
business category (73.6%), these initial 
outcomes suggested that the individual firm 
performance lags behind that of other small 
business categories.  This phenomenon is, 
in fact, born out in our regression models.  
Individual general small businesses receive 
fewer contracts and smaller awards per 
contract than do all other firms, except for 
women-owned small businesses.   
However, it does not appear that this is 
through any specific penalty in awards as 
much as in self-selection by the general 
small businesses themselves.  General small 
businesses tend to operate across fewer 
NAICS codes than do any other firms in our 
sample, except for women-owned 
businesses.  Additionally, general small 
businesses seem concentrated in NAICS 54 
(science and technology) and NAICS 33 
(manufacturing) which appear to be the 
most competitive contracts in the JSC data 
set.  In the three models where we examined 
contract award characteristics, the number 
of NAICS codes a firm operates in routinely 
emerged as the strongest performance 
predictor.  A tendency towards 
specialization in more competitive arenas 
likely limits potential contracting 
opportunities for general small businesses. 
While we find general small businesses to 
underperform nearly all other business 
categories, the same cannot be said for 
women-owned businesses.  Businesses 
owned by female entrepreneurs do not 
under or over-perform general small and 
large businesses in their receipt of contracts.  
Similarly, they do not outperform, nor do 
they underperform, general small 
businesses in the dollar amounts of 
contracts received.  Additionally, they do 
not appear to be any more or less 
specialized than general small or large 
businesses.  While Reardon et al. (2007) 
report that federal procurement targets, as a 
whole, have never been met for women-
owned businesses, we find little evidence 
that women-owned businesses are 
underperforming in their role as contractors 
for JSC.  Our findings that WOB are not 
underperforming in terms of number or 
dollar of contracts echoes the findings of 
Reardon et al., although their study pertains 
to contracts only.  Given the general 
underperformance of women-owned 
businesses, as a whole, in the federal 
procurement system, our findings suggest 
actions and policies in place at JSC are 
producing desired results. 
While our findings for women-owned 
businesses suggest performance that is 
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neither higher nor lower than the 
performance of small businesses, the same 
cannot be said for SDB's.  SDB's 
outperform general small businesses, 
receiving higher contract awards on 
average.  Additionally, SDB's neither under, 
nor over, perform large or small businesses 
in the numbers of contracts awarded.  Held 
et al. (2006) observes that SBIR programs 
targeted at SDB's may be less effective than 
direct programs targeted at SDB's.  While 
we cannot test the comparative suggested 
by Held and colleagues in this data set, we 
confirm their endorsement of targeted SDB 
programs.  Within the JSC procurement 
program, SDB's are receiving opportunities 
for their firms to flourish. 
Robb (2002) notes that SDB's tend to be 
underrepresented across industry categories 
and that SDB owners tend to concentrate in 
specific industries.  Our findings suggest 
that, within JSC procurements, SDB's tend 
to be less specialized than other firms and 
are more likely to operate across multiple 
NAICS codes than general small 
businesses.  We notice a concentration of 
SDB contracts awarded in NAICS 23 
(construction) which is consistent with 
Robb's analysis.  However, we also find 
NAICS 54 (science and technology) is also 
well represented for SDB's in the JSC 
network. 
Our examination of SBIR contracts 
suggests that the vast majority of SBIR 
awards go to firms operating in NAICS 54, 
which is unsurprising given the nature of 
SBIR work.  We further observe some 
SBIR contracts going to firms in NAICS 33 
(manufacturing).  Additionally, we find that 
SBIR firms are more likely to operate 
across multiple NAICS codes than do 
general small businesses.  Taken together, 
this suggests that JSC-SBIR contracts may 
be making strides to address the 
commercialization of R&D goals of the 
SBIR program (Held et al., 2006). 
Our performance evaluation for SBIR firms 
produces mixed, but generally positive, 
findings.  We find very weak evidence that 
SBIR firms receive fewer contracts, on 
average, than do general small and large 
businesses.  However, the statistical results 
for these findings are notably weak. Taken 
in conjunction with our finding that SBIR 
firms function across multiple NAICS 
codes, which substantially correlates with 
number of contracts awarded, this suggests 
that the negative finding is a statistical 
artifact.  Our evidence suggests that SBIR 
contracts provide substantially higher award 
dollars than do general small business 
contracts.  Our finding here is consistent 
with Connell's (2009) examination of SBIR 
awards for all federal agencies. 
On the whole, our examination of JSC 
contracts produces a number of important 
findings.  Specifically, JSC appears to 
perform admirably with regard to their 
mandate to stimulate business opportunities 
across historically underrepresented small 
businesses.  While other research suggests 
that the federal contracting performance 
lags behind policy goals (Held et al., 2006; 
Reardon et al., 2007), this NASA 
directorate offers evidence of programs 
producing desired outcomes.  To date, the 
examination of public-private partnerships - 
specifically those involving small business 
and underrepresented businesses - has 
largely emphasized macro-policy outcomes.  
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Our examination of a single directorate 
within one agency of the federal 
government finds that macro-policy 
outcomes are not always emblematic of 
directorate performance.   
Even though our research documents 
important positive outcomes for SDB's, our 
findings themselves suggest three important 
questions for future research.  These 
questions involve potential interaction 
effects, causal arguments, and network 
evolution.  We address each of these 
separately. 
In general, our investigation of procurement 
program categories focused on direct 
effects.  To this end, we examined outcomes 
for women-owned businesses as well as 
SDB's.  We find no significant over, nor 
underperformance for the former and 
indication of substantial positive 
performance for the latter.  We did not 
explore effects for businesses who occupy 
more than one category simultaneously (e.g. 
women-owned SDB's or SDB SBIR firms).  
In this, our research mirrors the general 
tenor of research examining public-private 
partnerships with the Federal government.  
Within our sample, few firms (less than 
3.5% of all small businesses) were flagged 
for multiple characteristics, offering little 
ability to explore these interactions.  It is 
interesting, given our findings, to inquire 
whether all women-owned businesses 
performed equally with their general small 
business competitors or, alternately, 
whether separation of SDB women-owned 
businesses would substantially alter these 
findings.  We believe this is an important 
question to pursue in the future. 
Our second research question addresses that 
of causality.  Research examining the 
general performance of SDB's (Robb, 2002) 
finds them underrepresented and 
underperforming in most industries.  To this 
end, a number of federal programs seek to 
remedy this historical underrepresentation, 
yet as a whole performance lags behind 
policy goals (Reardon et al., 2007).  In our 
study of JSC, we find SDB's well 
represented and performing at or above 
levels of general small businesses.  While 
this is a significant and admirable outcome, 
it is unclear, given the nature of our data, 
whether this outcome is policy driven. 
We do not know, given this data, whether 
specialized procurement programs, 
mentoring opportunities within the JSC 
network, or other JSC driven initiatives led 
to this outcome or whether the outcome is 
associated with other factors.  Further, 
because our data is panel data, taken within 
the same time period, all of our outcomes 
are thus correlations only.  We make no 
claims of causality, merely inferences of 
causation.  Given that our findings are 
atypical of general business and federal 
procurement (overall), further research 
should explore causal outcomes.  To what 
extent are the results we observe outcomes 
of concentrated efforts at JSC?  Which 
programs (assuming a causal link exists) 
produce these positive outcomes?  Can such 
programs (should they exist) be modeled 
and replicated elsewhere?  While we advise 
cautious optimism, future research should 
explore causal factors directly. 
Finally, do the correlations we find carry 
forwards?  Held and colleagues (2006) 
argue that programs like SBIR can function 
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as gateway programs bringing new firms 
into the federal participation networks.  
Audretsch (2003) suggests that participation 
in these programs can lead to higher 
innovation outputs in future periods.  
Connell (2009) suggests that public-private 
partnerships with the Federal government 
provide legitimacy benefits yielding greater 
opportunities for performance and growth 
in future periods.   
Do these benefits accrue?  Are firms in the 
JSC procurement system likely to remain in 
the network?  Assuming the firms will 
remain, is it equivocally true or are some 
types of firms more (or less) likely to 
remain in the network?  Do firms entering 
the federal network through one agency 
expand their connections across multiple 
agencies or do they tend to stay with one 
agency partner?  Do these partnerships 
materialize in firm performance benefits 
and, if so, are these benefits located entirely 
within the government network?  Given the 
nature of our data, we are unable to address 
these questions.  However, considering our 
findings in conjunction with existing 
research suggests that greater knowledge is 
needed about the antecedents and 
consequences of participation in public-
private partnerships with the federal 
government. 
We began this study with the intent of 
imPproving our understanding of correlates 
to participation within the JSC procurement 
network.  We couched our analysis in a 
macro-economic understanding of the 
historical underrepresentation of SDB's and 
how that informs federal procurement 
initiatives.  Our findings suggest that, at the 
directorate level, positive outcomes exist for 
historically underrepresented businesses.   
Federal agencies often operate with dual 
strategic mandates, an operational mandate 
tied directly to their identity (e.g. space 
exploration) and a policy mandate to enact 
their operational mandate in conjunction 
with broader federal initiatives (e.g. 
promoting small business and 
disadvantaged business opportunities).  
While federal guidelines subordinate the 
policy mandate to the operational mandate, 
the interaction of the two should always be 
considered.   
Specifically, JSC appears to have realized at 
least some of the policy goals the federal 
government has established for small, 
underrepresented businesses.  However, our 
analysis is restricted to contracts awarded 
within one Presidential administration.  
Current discussion regarding the future of 
NASA and potential changes to the mandate 
for several directorates may result in 
changes in funding levels and targets.  To 
the extent that current funding and targets 
realize policy goals for small and 
underrepresented businesses, substantial 
changes in mandates and funding should be 
carefully implemented to avoid losing any 
current benefits. 
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